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I. POSING THE PROBLEM
When James Henderson asked me to speak at the January 1987 AALS
Mini-Workshop on the "Tort Crisis" and Tort Reform and to offer a proposal
capable of implementation within the present political climate, I wondered if this was
a deliberate plan to co-opt a "crit."I I am on record as asserting that "[t]ort law is
intimately related to the rise of capitalism as both cause and effect," that it
discriminates on the basis of class, race, and gender, that it produces illness and
injury, and that it reproduces bourgeois ideology by commodifying experience and
justifying inequality. 2 Reanalyzing the best available study of tort law in action3, I
concluded:
" * * judges, legislators, and legal scholars will find it hard to deprecate the magnitude
of the threat of illness and injury, to claim that tort liability adequately controls risk, to
disregard the differential impact of injury and illness and the bias of the systems that respond
to misfortune, to pretend that those systems restore victims to the status quo ante, to ignore
the catastrophic impact of injury and illness on many households, or to justify our
fault-based tort law as an expression of popular morality. Confronted by this bitter reality,
the complicated rationalizations of tort law as compensation, control, or justice collapse like
a house of cards. 4
My colleague, Gary Schwartz, introducing the symposium in which that article
appeared, concluded that I sought to demonstrate "the basic depravity of tort' 5 -a
characterization I enthusiastically embrace.
Because critical legal scholars repeatedly are attacked as nihilists who offer
nothing in place of the legal system they so blithely demolish, I have advanced and
elaborated several proposals to reform or replace tort law. First, I have argued that
courts can, and should, reconsider the damages they award. Damages for non-
pecuniary loss require a lengthy and expensive adjudication in every case; uncertainty
about what the jury will award discourages settlement; a rationale and a criterion for
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Columbia University; Ph.D., 1974, University of London.
1. I participated in the founding Conference on Critical Legal Studies in Madison, Wisconsin, ten years ago and
have been involved with it ever since, most recently in helping to organize the tenth national conference on "Law and
Racism" in Los Angeles in January 1987. Those unfamiliar with the scholarship associated with critical legal studies
might consult: TnE Poincs OF L~w (D. Kairys ed. 1982); several special law review articles, e.g., Critical Legal Studies
Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REv. I (1984), Symposium on Critical Legal Studies, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 693 (1985), or A
Symposium of Critical Legal Studies, 34 Ai. U.L. REv. 939 (1985); or the bibliography, Kennedy & Klare, A
Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YAUE L.J. 461 (1984).
2. Abel, A Critique ofAmerican Tort Law, 8 BRIr. J. L. & Soc'v 199 (1981). An abridged version appears in THE
Pot'ncs OF LAw 185 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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non-pecuniary damages do not exist; and such damages extend capitalism's com-
modification of labor to all human experience. I would like to see such damage
awards eliminated. 6 Tort damages for accidental property loss-both physical
damage to property and lost wages, profits, and speculative gains-violate the values
of equality and community; furthermore, courts have been unable to develop a
satisfactory standard for deciding which losses should be compensated. I would like
to see these damages eliminated as well. 7 Neither reform would prevent anyone from
purchasing loss insurance, which would correctly reflect the value the purchaser
places on security and require the purchaser, rather than others, to pay for such
security. Second, I believe that legislatures should replace the entire fault-based tort
system with social insurance for medical and other rehabilitative care and some
minimum level of income maintenance. 8 There is nothing original or radical in this
suggestion; the experience of many West European countries, some Canadian
provinces, and New Zealand shows that it is fully compatible with a capitalist
economy and a liberal democracy. But the political feasibility of both these proposals
also is their theoretical weakness, for the fundamental problem is not tort law but
capitalism. It is capitalism that compels entrepreneurs to pursue profits by minimizing
expenditures on safety and externalizing accident costs. And it is capitalism that
allows those who own the means of production to subject workers to the risks of
injury and illness. In order to render the encounter with risk as equal and autonomous
as possible, it will be necessary to struggle for a decentralized democratic socialism,
in which workers own and manage their enterprises (and thus control the risks they
bear) and equalize those risks by reducing the division of labor and rotating dangerous
tasks. 9
I have reviewed these earlier positions because I want to emphasize that I stand
by each of them. I support judicial reform of tort damages, legislative enactment of
social insurance, and the struggle for democratic socialism. But if it is essential for
critical legal scholars to show the evils of existing legal and social arrangements and
to participate in imagining and creating alternative futures, it also is essential that we
engage in contemporary debates whose terms are defined by others in order to
demonstrate how our critical perspective can point to immediate concrete reforms. In
this Article, therefore, I take the present tort system as a given. I assume that
individual victims seeking damage awards will have to convince courts that negligent
defendants caused their injuries. And I assume that the goals of the system are to
compensate victims, discourage unreasonably dangerous behavior, and correct
normative violations, all at the lowest costs.
What, then, is the central problem of the tort system? What is the "tort crisis"?
Most commentators assert that the crisis is too much tort liability: too many claims,
the extension of liability rules to new situations, the relaxation of the requirement of
6. Abel, supra note 2, at 206-08.
7. Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental Loss?, 23 SAN DIEoO L. Raw. 79 (1986). A slightly
different version appears in THE LAw OF TORT: PoucIEs AND TRENDS IN LItaarY FOR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND Eco.omIc Loss
155 (M. Furmston ed. 1986).
8. Abel, supra note 2, at 208-11.
9. Abel, A Socialist Approach to Risk, 41 Mo. L. Rav. 695 (1982).
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fault, loose notions of causation, the erosion of defenses, and the inflation of damage
awards. These commentators also deplore the consequences: increased liablity
insurance premiums and the unavailability of insurance; the tendency for potential
defendants to "go bare"; and the number of entrepreneurs who have left the market
because they no longer can make a profit, thereby depriving consumers of valuable
goods and services.
There is a grain of truth in these claims, although I think they often are
exaggerated. Changes in substantive tort rules and jury decisionmaking undoubtedly
have favored plaintiffs, but it is essential to stress that we still have a fault-based
system. Astronomic jury awards constantly are publicized by the media: "Jurors
Assess Monsanto $108 Million Over Death"; "Maker of 'Suicide Doors' for Jeeps
Hit With $19.2-Million Jury Award"--to quote just two examples. 10 But most
awards are small (half of Cook County, Illinois awards between 1960 and 1979 were
under $8,000), and if the tiny minority of very large awards is excluded, the median
award actually declined during this period."' Furthermore, the failure of tort victims
to claim or to recover is never news. The media also have publicized the rise in
liability insurance premiums and the consequences of this: "Businesses Change
Ways in Fear of Lawsuits"; "Soaring Liability Premiums Threaten Some Bus
Lines"; "Ponies in Peril: Insurance Woes Threaten Griffith Park Ride"; "Insurance
Costs Imperil Recreation Industry"; "Liability Crisis Complicates Contraception." 12
But insurance costs are at least as much a function of fluctuations in interest rates and
market cycles that compel inflated premiums to restore reserves depleted by
insufficient premiums charged in earlier years. Thus, the recent "crisis" appears to
be ending more because a cycle is over than because of changes in substantive tort
law: the return on equity from liability insurance underwriting fell from a staggering
twenty-five percent in 1977 to two percent in 1984 but rose again to fifteen percent
in 1986.13
In any case, insurance costs often appear to be an excuse for producers who wish
to raise the price of goods and services rather than a compulsion to do so. The
Rochester Lilac Festival bemoaned a 400 percent increase in its liability insurance
10. Reinhold, Jurors Assess Monsanto $108 Million Over Death, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1986, § I, at 10, col. 4
($8 million compensatory, $100 million punitive damages for leukemia allegedly caused by exposure to benzene);
Klunder, Maker of'Suicide Doors' for Jeeps Hit With $19.2-Million Jury Award, L.A. Times, Oct. 16, 1986, Part I, at
22, col. I (remittitur from original award of $17.7 million special damages and $6 million for pain and suffering).
11. M. PETERsos & G. PRIEsr, THE CIVL JURY: TRENDS IN TRuALS AND VERDIcrs (1981), quoted in Rand Corporation,
Institute for Civil Justice, A Report on the First Four Program Years 17-18 (1984). Punitive damages were awarded in 2.5
percent of all trials in Cook County between 1980 and 1984; the median award was $43,000. M. PETERSON, S. SARNA &
M. SitssLEY, PuNmvE DAtmeAs: E.tmscA. FeUMms (1987).
12. Lindsey, Businesses Change Ways in Fear of Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1985, § I, at 1, col. 2 (closing
of ice skating rinks, practice of defensive architecture); Lindsey, Soaring Liability Premiums Threaten Some Bus Lines,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1985, § I, at 16, col. I; Harvey, Ponies in Peril: Insurance Woes Threaten Griffith Park Ride, L.A.
Times, Feb. 11, 1986, Part II, at 1, col. 3; Hanley, Insurance Costs Imperil Recreation Industry, N.Y. Times, May 12,
1986, § I, at 1, col. I (liquor banned at Candlewood Lake, sailboard races on Long Island Sound, fireworks at festivals,
etc.); Dullea, Liability Crisis Complicates Contraception, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1986, § II, at 8, col. 2 (IUDs unavailable
in the U.S.; "'It's one more example of how the consumer is being hurt by the malpractice crisis,' Dr. Pascario added.
'No sane physician would dare give an IUD today except to his wife. "'). For a dissenting view on the costs and benefits
of IUDs, see M. Merrz, AT AN" CoS=: CoepoRAT GREED, WorEN, AND THE DALKON SHELD (1985).
13. Glaberson, Liability Rates Flattening Out As Crisis Eases, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1987, § I, at 1, col. 5.
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premium, but this still represented only $0.04 a ticket.' 4 Ski lift operators have
complained loudly, but their premiums also constitute only three percent of lift ticket
prices. The Boy Scouts of America deplored the increase in their liability insurance
premium from $2 million to $10 million in 1986, but they planned to respond with
an annual surcharge of $20 a troop-hardly a major burden on any Cub or Boy
Scout. 15 A 1978 survey found that product, occupier, and general liability costs
(insurance premiums plus damage payments) totalled less than 0.2 percent of sales;
in that manufacturing sector where they were highest (rubber and plastics), they
constituted only 0.58 percent; even among hospitals, they were only 2.35 percent of
gross income.16 In 1983 products liability claims cost industry much less than one
percent of total sales.' 7 And even the most notorious liablity "crisis"-medical
malpractice-has been greatly overblown. Among self-employed physicians in 1985,
malpractice insurance premiums were only nine percent of the total costs of practice;
they ranged from two percent of gross income for those practicing internal medicine
to eight percent for obstetrician/gynecologists. For hospitals, malpractice insurance
premiums per inpatient day increased from $3.02 in 1983 to $5.60 in 1985, but these
represented only 0.8 percent and 1.1 percent of total costs, respectively. 18
Although I believe that the empirical evidence for a liability insurance "crisis"
is weak and that the "crisis" is actually a mere reflection of an economic cycle
produced by market forces, I do not wish to rest my critique on those grounds.
Instead, I want to advance three propositions. Everyone working within the generally
accepted paradigm of contemporary tort law must concede the first proposition:
successful tort claims do not create liability costs, they merely shift them from
victims to tortfeasors. It is the torfeasors who create liability costs by injuring
victims. 19 My second proposition is empirical and therefore subject to correction and
refinement by further research, but I do not think it is particularly controversial. If
liability costs are high, it is because injuries are frequent and serious. The United
States Bureau of the Census recently found that fourteen percent of those between
ages 16 and 64 and twenty-one percent of those over age 15 have significant physical
disabilities2° (of course, not all these are the result of tortious act). The American Bar
14. See Hanley, supra note 12.
15. Pear, Boy Scouts Plan Liability Fee, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1986, § I, at 17, col. 1.
16. G. EADS & P. REurER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCrS: CoRFORAn RESPONSES TO PRODucr LIABiury Lsw AND R-GuLAsio.N
30-31 (1983).
17. Id. at 121.
18. U.S. GENERAL AccouNrING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: INSURANCE COSTS INCREASED rur VARIED AMONG PYSICTANs
AND HosPrrAts 4 (1986) (GAO/HRD-86-112).
19. There are only two possible objections to this statement. First, victims do not really suffer injury either because
claims are fraudulent or because damages are inflated. The tort system is no less able today than previously to identify
and reject fraudulent claims; and I agree with critics of damages for pain and suffering. Second, those held liable did not
cause the injuries. If the assertion is that the victims caused their own injuries, defendants can invoke doctrines of
contributory or comparative fault or assumption of risk (although I would prefer to see all three eliminated). If the
assertion is that a third party caused the injury, the defendant can invoke doctrines of cause in fact or proximate cause
(although I find both hopelessly ambiguous). If the objection is that the tort system imposes high transaction costs, I agree
completely, but that is an argument for reforming or abolishing the entire system, not for preventing or discouraging
particular claims.
20. Census Study Reports I in 5 Suffering from a Disability, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1986, § II, at 7. col. 1. See
generally CoMMITrE oN TRAUMA REsEARC, INJURY IN AMERIcA: A CONINUING PRUC HALT' PROBLEM (1985).
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Foundation study of legal needs found that fifty-eight percent of all men and
forty-four percent of all women reported that they had incurred a serious tort problem
during their lifetimes. 2' And the investigation by the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal
Studies found that forty out of every 1,000 people had suffered at least two weeks of
incapacity from an injury during the preceeding twelve months.22
It is my third proposition the core of this Article-that is controversial. The
real tort crisis is old, not new. It is a crisis of underclaiming rather than overclaiming.
The tort system does not encourage fraud or display excessive generosity but fails to
compensate needy, deserving victims. It does not place undue burdens on socially
valuable activities but fails to discourage unreasonable risks. And it does not censure
the innocent but fails to condemn the guilty. The rhetoric of those who deplore the
burden of liability and insurance costs is simply another expression of the conserva-
tive backlash of recent years. It can be summarized in a sentence: "Let's hang on to
what we have, and when others seek the same privileges we'll say our society can't
afford it." This ideology embraces, reinforces, and unifies diverse positions.
Although it concedes that the early civil rights movement expressed legitimate
grievances, it contends that racial minorities no longer have any reason to complain
and that affirmative action violates the rights of whites. Characterizing them as
threats to the family, it rejects the claims of feminists, which never were granted the
same legitimacy as those of blacks. It portrays environmentalists as a privileged few
pursuing their self-interests at the expense of the economy. 23 Insisting that Americans
always have been excessively litigious, it declares that this indulgence now has gotten
out of hand. 24 It blames our alleged contentiousness on the fact that we have "too
many" lawyers-largely because women and minorities insisted on entering the
profession beginning in the mid-1960s. Advocates of these views propose a number
of solutions. They favor delegalizing significant areas of social relations. 25 They
propose alternatives to the formal legal system. 26 They favor deregulation of the
economy. 27 And they seek to privatize as much of the public sector as possible (while
enormously expanding the military, police, and prisons). Diatribes about the "tort
liability crisis" are simply another manifestation of this defense of privilege. From its
perspective, tort victims are like welfare cheats-social parasites who seek riches
without effort and often commit fraud to get them.
21. B. CURRsAN, THE LEGAL NEEDs OF TE PuBuc: THE FLNA. REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 117 (1977).
22. CO'MPESATION AND SUPPORT, supra note 3, at 31.
23. I have criticized such views in Abel, Blaming Victims, 1985 Ai. B. FoUND. Rrs. J. 401 (review essay on M.
DouGLs & A. WILDAVSKS, RISK AND CULTURE (1982)).
24. See the extensive citations in Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983); Galanter, The
Legal Malaise; or, Justice Observed, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 537 (1985); Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion,
46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986). For another critique of this perspective, see L. FRImEDAN, TOTAL Jus'nc (1985).
25. I have criticized this position in Abel, Delegalization: A Critical Review of Its Ideology, Manifestations, and
Social Consequences, in ALTERNATIVE REcrSPo.iSEN uND ALTERNAnTvEN zmi REcrr 27 (E. Blankenburg, E. Klausa and H.
Rottleuthner eds. 1980) (Jahrbuch fur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie, vol. 6).
26. I have criticized this position in Abel, Conservative Conflict and the Reproduction of Capitalism: The Role of
Informal Justice, 9 M'L J. Soc. or L. 245 (1981); The Contradictions oflnformal Justice, in 1 THE POLTICS OF INFORMAL
JusmcE 267 (R. Abel ed. 1982); Informalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law, 19 CL.EINuGHOousE REv. 275 (1985).
27. I have criticized this position in Risk as an Arena of Struggle, 83 MicH. L. REv. 772 (1985) (review essay on
E. BARDA cH & R. KAoAN, Gou;o BY THE BooK: THE PROBLE2i or REGUIATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982)).
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II. MANY INJURY VICTIMS FAIL To CLAIM
Like the second proposition, my third proposition-that many tort victims fail to
claim-also is empirical (I discuss its normative significance in Part Ill). Proving a
negative always is difficult. Proving this negative is costly as well, for it is necessary
to establish the population of injury victims who could recover tort damges before
examining how many of them, and which ones, actually do so. Only a few studies
attempt this rigorous task. The joint study of the legal needs of the public by the
American Bar Association and the American Bar Foundation in 1973 and 1974 found
that only sixteen percent of those who reported tort problems consulted lawyers about
them; the proportion ranged from thirty-four percent of those who suffered personal
injury to eight percent of those who suffered property damage.2 8 Other studies have
disclosed that the claims rate varies significantly by the environment within which the
injury occurs. One investigator compared expert judgments about injuries caused by
medical malpractice, based on the 1974 records of twenty-three California hospitals,
with claims closed between July 1975 and December 1978 by private insurers and
reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. This study found
that one in every 126 patients suffered an injury due to negligence. Only a tenth of
these filed a claim. And only forty percent of the claims, or four percent of the
negligent injuries, resulted in payment. Even among those who suffered major
permanent partial disability as a result of medical malpractice, less than seventeen
percent filed claims, and only 6.5 percent received any payment.2 9 Another study of
the 1972 records of two hospitals found that only one out of every fifteen significant
injuries caused by malpractice led to claims (6.7 percent) and acknowledged that even
this was an overestimate because not all incidents of malpractice could be detected
from the records.3o And a third study discovered that forty percent of the malpractice
incidents physicians themselves report to their insurers never result in claims. 31
Many workplace injuries also fail to produce claims but for different reasons:
employers discourage workers from reporting or claiming, in an effort to conceal
such incidents for fear of liability, increases in liability insurance premiums, greater
regulatory activity, and criminal penalties. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which rely on employer reports,
recorded 3,750 worker deaths on the job in 1985, whereas the National Safety
Council independently estimated the number at 11,600, more than three times as
many. The Department of Labor recently cited Chrysler for willful failure to report
182 worker injuries at a single assembly plant and sought a $910,000 fine. Chrysler
settled the charge by paying $295,000, plus another $10,502 for offenses at two other
plants. The Labor Department also cited Union Carbide, Monsanto, Shell Oil, Fina,
28. CUmA, supra note 21, at 145.
29. P. DAczoN, MEDICAL MAtmaRcncE: THEORY, EvIDENCE, AND Punuc Poucy 19-21, 23 (1985).
30. L. Pocincki, S. Dagger & B. Schwartz, The Incidence oflatrogenic Injuries, Appendix to Report of Secretary's
Commission on Medical Malpractice 50-70 (1973) (DHEW #OS 73-89), quoted in W. SciwArrz & N. Ko'.t.SA,
DocroRs, DAMAGES AND DETERRENCE: AN Ecoo.uc Vmw oF MEDICAL MARACTICE 11 (1978) (Rand # 2340-NIH/RC).
31. OFFCE OF THoE SEcEr, RY, U.S. DEr. oF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELARE, SUoDY oF MEDcI. MALPRACTICE LAMS
CLOsED IN 1970 (1973), quoted in W. Srawurz & N. Ko.%EsAR, supra note 30, at 12.
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and USX Corporation for similar concealment. 32 The United Food and Commercial
Workers Union has filed a complaint against IMP Inc., a midwest meatpacking plant,
alleging that it kept two sets of injury logs in 1985-the one submitted to OSHA
showed 160 injuries or illnesses in its processing department, but the plant's own
books recorded 1,800. 3 The California Supreme Court has taken the unprecedented
step of holding Johns-Manville liable to its employees in tort rather than workers'
compensation because, for decades, Johns-Manville concealed from workers the fact
that company health records showed they were suffering from exposure to asbestos.
34
A contemporary American study found that only about thirty-seven percent of work
accident victims claim workers' compensation.
3 5
Even road accidents display significant underclaiming, despite the facts that the
police generally record the event, the defendant usually is a stranger to the victim,
and liability insurance coverage is very widespread. In New York City, eighty-seven
percent of a random sample of those suffering slight shock or contusion in an
automobile accident in 1957 had made a claim by September 1959, sixty-six percent
had retained a lawyer, and sixty-four percent had obtained some compensation; 36 but
it seems likely that higher proportions of that half of the sample who could not be
located failed to take each of these steps. A Michigan study in the early 1960s found
that only fourteen percent of all automobile accident victims hired lawyers; but
among those who suffered $500 in medical expenses, two weeks of hospitalization,
permanent physical impairment or death, half of the victims or their families did
SO. 3 7
The most comprehensive study of the rate of claiming has been conducted by the
Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies. 38 In 1976 and 1977 the Centre interviewed
1,202 individuals who had been identified in a previous survey as having suffered at
least two weeks of incapacity due to injury within a recent twelve month period. It
found that 5.3 percent had incurred their injuries on the road, 8.7 percent at work, and
eighty-six percent in "other" settings. The proportions who considered claiming,
however, varied inversely with the importance of the category: forty-seven percent of
32. Noble, Certain Numbers Can Kill, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1986, § 11, at 16, col. 4. Noble, Chrysler Will Pay
$295,000 Fine for Violations on Injury Records, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1987, § I, at 7, col. 5. The Labor Department
subsequently fined General Dynamics Corporation $615,000 for 174 instances of willfully failing to report workplace
injuries and illnesses. It was the eighteenth major corporation to be fined more than $100,000 for record-keeping
violations within a sixteen-month period. General Dynamics Corp. Is Fined $615,000 by U.S. Safety Agency, N.Y.
Times, July 30, 1987, at 15.
33. Risen, Injury Rate Soaring, Workers at Meatpacking Plant Say, L.A. Times, Mar. 2, 1987, Part IV, at 1,
col. 2.
34. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
A bill recently introduced into Congress would require the government to notify workers when they have been exposed
to dangerous substances. It is opposed by the National Association of Manufacturers and 176 associations of small
businesses. Several years ago, when the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health notified 835 workers of
Synalloy Company that they had been exposed to a chemical that caused bladder disorders, 171 claimed damages, and
the company settled 121 of the claims for a total of $500,000. Debating a Bill on Job Hazards, N.Y. Times, July 13,
1987, at 22, col. 1.
35. Sincere, Processing Workers" Compensation Claims in Illinois, 1982 AM. B. FouN. Rrs. J. 1073, 1105.
36. R. Hu.m-G & G. NruuwRmm, Wuo SuEs rN NEw YoRK Cary? A STUDY oF Aurolosmie Acctmmr CAmIs 4-8, 36-39
(1962).
37. Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 Micu. L. REv. 279, 285 (1964).
38. Co.P04mAIsoN ANV SUPPrT, supra note 3.
19871
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
road accident victims and forty-six percent of work accident victims considered
claiming but only nine percent of victims in "other" accidents. The proportions
actually obtaining damages were lower still: twenty-nine percent of road accident
victims, nineteen percent of work accident victims, and only two percent of victims
of "other" accidents. Because this last category greatly outnumbered the other two,
a total of only twelve percent of all those who suffered two weeks of incapacity as a
result of injury recovered any damges. 39
The levels of claiming in the United States and Great Britain are surprisingly
similar-about half of road accident victims, somewhat fewer work accident victims,
and hardly any victims of other accidents, who are by far the largest category-even
though there are several reasons why victim behavior might differ. On one hand,
Britain awards costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff, damages are lower, contingent
fees are prohibited (although a victim's solicitor may forgive the costs of an
unsuccessful claim), social insurance is more comprehensive, and cultural attitudes
differ. On the other hand, legal aid is available to tort victims in Britain but not the
United States, and the British rule on costs allows a successful plaintiff to keep the
entire award, without the deduction of attorney's fees. 40
A number of qualitative studies tend to support the conclusion that victims of
injury are reluctant to sue, not overeager, and that many social environments
discourage claims. David Engel uncovered strong social pressures against claiming
by injury victims in a rural community in southern Illinois, even when the tortfeasor
was a foreign corporation.41 Donald Landon found that small-town lawyers in rural
Missouri were reluctant to sue local notables. 42 Carol Greenhouse reported that the
largely Baptist population of an Atlanta suburb strenuously opposed recourse to the
courts. 43 These attitudes are not peculiar to the country or the South. M.P.
Baumgartner learned that the upper-middle class inhabitants of a Connecticut
bedroom community near New York City rarely complained about neighbors, even
when their behavior was quite outrageous, although working-class residents
expressed their conflicts more openly. 44 Similar differences emerged in Boston:
neighbors in a middle-class area tended not to voice their grievances against each
39. See Abel, supra note 4, at 1012-13. A pilot study for this survey found that virtually none of those who
suffered accidents in the home sought compensation or recovered. Burman, Genn & Lyons, The Use of Legal Services
by Victims ofAccidents in the Home-A Pilot Study, 40 MOD. L. REv. 47 (1977). An earlier survey of all accident victims,
not just those with serious injuries, found that only 6.5% obtained any compensation through the tort system. RoYAL
CoMssION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY, REPORT (1978) (Cmnd 7054-1) (Pearson Commission).
40. ROYAL ComIISSION ON LEGAL SERviCs, 2 FINAL REPORT 252 (1979) (Cmnd 7648-1).
41. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAw
& Soc'y REV. 551 (1984).
42. Landon, Clients, Colleagues, and Community: The Shaping of Zealous Advocacy in Country Law Practice,
1985 AMi. B. FOUND. RES. J. 81.
43. Greenhouse, Nature Is to Culture as Praying Is to Suing: Legal Pluralism in an American Suburb, 20 J. Lro.
PLURAUS.i 17 (1982).
44. Baumgartner, Social Control in Suburbia, in TowARD A GENERAL THEORY or Soca. CoaMMoL 79, 82, 93 (D. Black
ed. 1984).
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other,45 but this was less true in a poorer multiethnic community. 46 Even New
Yorkers, reknowned for their short fuses, seem to swallow most affronts. A series of
psychological experiments inflicted loud noises on subjects trying to take a test,
study in a library, or watch a movie but elicited few complaints; there was little
difference under more extreme conditions, in which subjects were accused of
"taking" another's valuable ring, sometimes in the presence of a sympathetic
observer. 47
Although tort victims are my sole concern in this Article, it is important to note
that they are not alone in their reluctance to claim. Consumers are equally restrained
in complaining about the failure of products to perform as promised. 48 A survey of
consumers found that only forty-two percent of those who perceived problems with
their purchases complained to anyone: 32.5 percent of those with weak problems and
fifty-two percent of those with strong problems. 49 The ABA-ABF study revealed that
only seven percent of consumers who encountered a problem with a major purchase
consulted a lawyer. 50
Even those who observe criminal behavior tend to look the other way. A German
study of shoplifting in a Freiburg supermarket found that almost none of those
watching the crime-either shoppers or store personnel-reported it to the store
authorities. 5' Even significant proportions of crime victims themselves fail to
complain to the police. In the United States in 1983, fifty-eight percent of crimes of
violence but only twenty-six percent of theft crimes were reported to the police;
within the first category, report rates ranged from twenty-eight percent for attempted
robbery without injury to seventy-four percent for larceny of less than $50 to
sixty-five percent for completed purse snatching. Only thirty-seven percent of crimes
45. Buckle & Thomas-Buckle, Self-Help Justice: Dispute Processing in American Neighborhoods (1981)
(unpublished paper 1981).
46. Merry, Going to Court: Strategies of Dispute Management in an American Urban Neighborhood, 13 LAw &
Soc'y REv. 891 (1979).
47. Moriarty, A Nation of Willing Victims: Urban Danger and Urban Insult, PsVcioLoGy TODAY, Apr. 1975, at 43.
48. See generally No AccEss To LAw: ALrERNMvEs To iH Aki.AN Jtc ictAL Svsrysi (L. Nader ed. 1980). The Center
for Auto Safety has accused five manufacturers of following a policy of "secret warranties" with respect to thirty million
cars and light trucks. They alleged that the manufacturers consistently agreed to make repairs when pressed by consumers
but refused to publicize their willingness to do so. The manufacturers have denied the charge. 5 Car Makers Assailed Over
Secret Warranties, N.Y. Times, September 6, 1987, at 20, col. 1.
49. Best & Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing
Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAw & Soc'v REV. 701, 716 (1977); see also A. Bnsr & A. ANDPAssN, TAtxrGO
BACK To BusiNEss: VoIcED ANDo UNVoIcED CoNsuM CO. AiNmrs (1975); A. B sr, Vn Co.suWiu COMiAIN: CONNsIuR JUSTICE,
PROBIS ANs PRosPcrS (1981).
50. CoRsAs, supra note 21, at 146.
51. Blankenburg, The Selectivity of Legal Sanctions: An Empirical Investigation of Shoplifting, 11 LAw & Soc'v
REv. 109 (1976). In 1986, Marshall Field paid its employees $114,000 for reporting theft-S10O if by a customer, $500
if by a fellow worker-bounties that have allowed the store to reduce its security force by a quarter since 1985. Taylor,
When Everyone Is a Store Detective, N.Y. Times, September 13, 1987, s. 4, at 19, col. 1. And the federal False Claims
Amendments Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1986), which pays informants double and treble damages, has led to reports
of alleged Medicare fraud and other abuses of government expenditure. Spiegel, Whistle-Blower's Lawsuit Accuses
Scripps Clinic, Eye Doctor, of Fraud, L.A. Times, September 9, 1987, Part I, at 3, col. 1.
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within the household were reported. 52 These proportions remained quite constant
during the 1970s 53 and did not vary greatly by city.
54
These data indicate that only a small proportion of victims take any action to
redress their injuries. I am sure many readers can and will raise methodological
quibbles. But in the face of such consistent findings, the burden clearly is on those
who insist that there are too many tort claims to support their view with equally
persuasive empirical studies.
III. INJURED VIcrIMs SHOULD CLAIM
Demonstrating empirically that many injured victims fail to claim is only half of
my argument; I also must explain normatively why they should do so. I want to
postpone for the moment a discussion of tort theory and see what we can learn by
analogy from several other realms of behavior where participation is postively valued:
politics, the market, cultural life, and social services.
All theories of democratic politics strongly encourage citizen participation.
Indeed, we compel certain forms of public service, such as jury duty or the wartime
draft. We view an informed, engaged public as the prerequisite of a healthy polity.
The New England town meeting remains a nostalgic symbol of direct democracy.
Readers who are lawyers or law teachers will feel a sense of obligation to participate
in bar associations or faculty self-governance. Indeed, the voluntary associations that
de Tocqueville characterized as the foundation of American democracy more than
150 years ago remain an essential building block of liberal pluralism.55 Many states
have a long tradition of submitting important issues to popular referenda. Because the
size of our nation makes representative institutions a necessity, we view the level of
participation in electoral politics as an index of the quality of political life. It is an
ineradicable source of shame that Americans excluded racial minorities and women
from both voting and holding political office for so long-anyone who saw the recent
television documentary, "Keep Your Eyes on the Prize," 5 6 must have been horrified
to relive the racist efforts to prevent blacks from registering to vote. The poll tax and
the literacy test are historical embarrassments. Today, ballots and voter information
pamphlets often are published in several languages in order to reach the largest
number of people. Starting with Baker v. Cart57, the Supreme Court repeatedly has
struck down gerrymandering and insisted on a standard of one person, one vote. The
52. U.S. DEFARTitENT OF JusncE, BURu oF JusTcIC STATISTICS, RIMINAL VicnIZATIO" IN THlE UNTI'r STATES, 1983, at
85 (1985) (NCJ-96459). The federal National Crime Survey itself may greatly understate the number of rape victims who
fail to report to the police. It stated that between 2 and 4 out of every thousand college-age women had been raped in the
previous six months. A survey of 6,159 students at 32 colleges found that 38 out of every 1,000 women had been raped
in the previous six months, and 275 out of every thousand reported having been raped since the age of 14. N.Y. Times,
April 21, 1987, at 22, col. 5.
53. U.S. DEFRrsmENT OF JusncE, BUREAU OF JUTIcE STATISTICS, SOURCEIOOK or CIuSINAu. J sTc STAIScT--1981, at
234-35 (T. Flanagan, D. van Alstyne & M. Gottfredson eds. 1982).
54. U.S. DEPAR iENTr OF JusncE, LAw ENFoR iENr AssISTANcE AonIINiNrRAoN, NATIONAL CRm.AL. JUsIcE Iror,tAwnos
AND STATISTICS SERVICE, CRIMINAL VICTnIZATION SURVEY IN 13 ANtlERIC CrIES (1975).
55. A. ne TocQurvu.E, DFiocitAcV IN AsmsIcA (2 vols.) (H. Reeve Trans. 1900).
56. For the printed version see J. Wn.uts, EYEs oN TE PIZE: AsIERICA's CIVIL RiGous YEsAS, 1954-1965 (1987).
57. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Voting Rights Act of 1965 is seen today as an essential contribution to strengthening
democracy. One of the major obstacles to William Rehnquist's recent confirmation
as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court was the allegation that he encouraged
Republican challenges to black and Latino voters in Arizona. We condemn South
Africa for continuing to exclude blacks from the franchise; and many are equally
critical of one-party states that deny voters any real choice. Nations in Western
Europe and elsewher6 in the democratic world are justly proud of their high levels of
voter participation: some even compel citizens to vote. By contrast, the United States
has reason to be ashamed of its low voter turnout, which rarely exceeds half the
qualified electorate, even in presidential contests, and often falls much lower at other
times. We do not view this with indifference as just another form of "consumer
preference." The California legislature, dismayed by the fact that only 43.4 percent
of those eligible to register and vote actually did so in the November 1986 presidential
election, presently is considering bills that would allow registration to take place on
election day, upon obtaining a driver's license, and in government offices, and would
keep the polls open an additional two hours. 58 Furthermore, we have become
increasingly uncomfortable about the extent to which electoral choices are shaped by
control over the economic resources necessary to buy the media coverage that has
become the dominant means of influencing voters, at least in the larger constituencies
that characterize national politics. 59
The health of a market economy, like that of a democratic polity, is measured
by the degree of participation. High and rising productivity is good; unutilized
productive capacity and stagnant production are bad. Full employment is good; high
levels of unemployment and underemployment are bad. Consumer spending and
confidence are good; underconsumption can cause a crisis. Free markets are good;
anything that interferes with market activity is bad, whether it is state regulation,
monopoly, or restrictive practices. I mentioned the Reagan Administration's attack
on regulation earlier; the monopolies and restrictive practices of the professions also
have been under attack in recent years. 6° Indeed, the Chairman of the Board of the
Legal Services Corporation, in a speech at the 1987 mid-year meeting of the
American Bar Association, proposed to satisfy the needs of the poor for legal
representation by abolishing unauthorized practice rules and allowing anyone to
58. Ingram, Package of Bills Aims at Boosting Voter Turnout, L.A. Times, Mar. 5, 1987, Part I, at 3, col. 5.
Governments also encourage other forms of political participation:
Acknowledging that illegal immigrants have been slow to sign up for amnesty, a West Los Angeles
consortium of media agencies hired by U.S. immigration authorities plans to mount an "aggressive" wave of
nationwide advertising early next month to encourage more to apply....
The campaign is part of an 18-month, $10.7-million contract awarded by the immigration service in April
to the Justice Group, a consortium of three media companies headed by Republican Party activist and businessman
Fernando Oaxaca, to persuade illegal aliens, historically mistrustful of La Migra, that federal authorities are
sincere in carrying out the provisions of the landmark immigration law that was signed last year...
In addition to the ads, the group has produced booklets and brochures in several languages, including
English, Spanish, Chinese, Korean, Polish and Arabic.
Ramos, Amnesty Ad Campaign Hopes to Heat Up Cool Response, L.A. Times, June 25, 1987, Part I, at 36, col. 1.
59. Michael Walzer mounts the most powerful criticism of the capacity of wealth to buy political power in SpHaisS
OF JusncE (1983).
60. See Abel, Lanyers, in LAw AND IRE SocUL Scmc.S, Ch. 8 (L. Lipson & S. wheeler ed. 1987); Abel, Why Does
the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REv. 639 (1981).
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practice law. 61 Observers seeking to explain the failure of third-world economies to
grow have praised the "informal sector" and recognized the inevitability and value
of black and gray markets. 62 Although, as we have seen, consumers rarely complain
about unsatisfactory goods and services, 63 commentators argue that they should be
encouraged to do so in order to provide producers with the information necessary to
improve quality. And some retailers do welcome complaints for just this reason. 64
We also value participation in cultural life, encouraging it by investing
substantial resources in public education and even making education compulsory.
Obviously, literacy and numeracy are essential for participation in political and
economic life as well. We view functional illiteracy as a national and personal
tragedy. The debate over bilingual education is, among other things, a disagreement
about how to achieve the highest level of participation in public affairs. But we value
involvement in cultural life for its own sake, too. Americans are proud of their
diverse cultural heritages and seek to preserve them. And even though many deplore
the banality and superficiality of much popular culture, others argue that the
consumption of both television and popular music is not a passive process but rather
an active critical engagement.
By contrast with our commitment to political, economic, and cultural partici-
pation, our attitude toward the consumption of social services is ambivalent. On one
hand, the image of the welfare scrounger constantly is invoked by both politicians and
the media, successfully persuading many that welfare services should be kept to a
minimum. On the other hand, we feel very differently about the consumption of some
social services. I already mentioned education: high school dropouts are considered
a failure of the system, and the high levels of enrollment in tertiary and adult
education are a matter of national pride. We feel the same way about public health
services: consumption of antenatal and infant preventive care is strongly encouraged.
The value of public (and philanthropic) subsidies for cultural and recreational
activities also is measured by consumption levels: museum attendance figures, public
library circulation, viewers of public television programs, crowds at public celebra-
tions, use of the state and national parks. In Western European countries more
committed to social welfare, "take-up" rates for all social services are viewed as
measures of success, not failure.
I believe that our enthusiasm for participation in politics, the market, cultural
life, and social services should extend to participation in the legal system. 65 Litigation
is an important form of political activity: courts exercise political authority, modify
substantive laws, and allocate resources. Litigation also affects the economy,
61. Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1987, at 18, col. 1.
62. Vargas Llosa, In Defense of the Black Market, N.Y. Times Mag., Feb. 22, 1987, at 28, col. 1.
63. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
64. Ross & Littlefield, Complaint as a Problem-Solving Mechanism, 12 LAw & Soc'y REv. 199 (1978).
65. Economists view "exit" as both a material incentive and an informational signal. See A. Husmtns, E r,
VoicE, AND LOYALTY (1970). This also may be true, if to a lesser extent, in cultural life and social services. But it is not
true in politics and certainly not in the legal system. Legal systems that are shunned by the majority of citizens are a sign
of imperialism (the transfer of European codes to Africa), authoritarianism (Ataturk's importation of the Swiss codes
into Turkey), or simply elite indifference (the Manchu dynasty's desire to discourage litigation).
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conveys information, alters prices, and corrects market imperfections. Litigation
declares and changes fundamental cultural values. Additionally, litigants consume a
vital social service, since courts (and of course legislatures) are subsidized by the
state. As I noted at the beginning of this Article, many commentators deplore the
levels of law, lawyers, and litigaton in contemporary America. We can certainly
imagine and strive to create a society in which the role of law would be greatly
diminished-Marx, after all, hoped that the state would wither away under
communism. But it is only realistic to acknowledge that such an ideal is either
utopian (in the good sense of that word) or romantically nostalgic. Our society
possesses only weak historical traditions; it constantly experiences rapid change; our
population is extremely heterogeneous; there are substantial inequalities among
classes, races, genders, ethnic groups, and regions; monopoly capitalism enormously
concentrates power; national, state, and local governments all threaten individuals. In
such an environment, law is an essential ingredient of social order.
If readers have followed me this far, accepting the view that participation in the
legal system is socially valuable, I still must show that injury victims should be
encouraged to claim tort damages. I will construct this argument within the
conventional paradigm of tort policy, even though I have been harshly critical of it
in the past, because my goal is to persuade those committed to the existing system
that more claims are desirable. Most scholars agree that tort law has three principal
objectives: redressing the violation of important norms, compensating victims, and
discouraging unsafe behavior. I will take those up in sequence.
A tort is, among other things, a normative violation. The tortfeasor has behaved
dangerously and has caused injury to another. In order to preserve and strengthen the
norm against dangerous behavior it is imperative to publicize the violation and
punish the wrongdoer. Durkheim argued that the function of transgressions is to give
society an opportunity to punish, thereby reasserting its commitment to the norm that
has been broken. 66 The Oxford Centre's study found that attributions of moral blame
are strongly influenced by the victim's perception of the possibility of obtaining
damages from the person or entity blamed.67 Consequently, increasing victim
confidence in the possibility of recovery would have the salutary effect of reviving
moral judgments.
But the norm against negligently injuring another also must be redressed for the
sake of the victim's psychological well being. Our legal system does little to respond
to the sense of violation and outrage experienced by victims, especially those injured
seriously and permanently. 68 Indeed, fear of liability in the particular case and of its
66. E. DURKH.INI, THE DvisIoN 'O LABOR IN SoCIETY, ch. 2 (G. Simpson trans. 1933); K. ERIKSON, \VAYWaD PURIrs
(1966). The prosecution of white collar crime is an example of the use of a normative violation to strengthen the norm.
See F. CuUEN, W. MAA.EsrAo & G. CAVENDER, CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK: THE FORD PIro CASE ANo BEYOND (1987).
67. CoxM'ENsAInojND SUPPORT, supra note 3, at 149-59; Abel, supra note 4, at 1022.
68. The criminal justice system recently has displayed increased concern toward involving crime victims in the
prosecution of criminals. See, e.g., N. MORRIs, THE FU ToU Ir N'msom ENr 55-57 (1974); A. Rosir & D. CREssEY, JUsncE
BY CoNsErNr 174 (1976); DuBow & Becker, Patterns of Victim Advocacy, in CRINAL JUsTIcE AND THE VlcTnl,1 147 (W.
McDonald ed. 1976); Heinz & Kerstetter, Pretrial Settlement Conference: Evaluation of a Reform in Plea Bargaining,
13 LAw & Soc'v REv. 349 (1979).
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precedential value in others often leads defendants to continue denying moral
responsibility even after paying damages. Other societies, notably Japan, require the
tortfeasor to apologize to the victim as part of the remedial process. 69 And where
interpersonal honor is highly valued, victims or their kin must seek revenge. 70 There
are obviously strong cultural reasons why it would be difficult, and perhaps
undesirable, to incorporate apologies or feuds into our own tort process. But that does
not alter the necessity of responding to legitimate hurt and anger by encouraging the
victim to seek legal redress in every case. Unredressed wrongs allow resentment to
fester, breeding a feeling of pervasive injustice, and sometimes leading to acts of
vengeance. 71
If late twentieth-century American tort law deemphasizes the normative element
of the defendant's act and the victim's grievance, it clearly makes compensation the
central objective. For some the motivation is compassion; for others the concern is
economic: restoring the productive capacity of the victim and preventing the victim
from becoming a public charge.72 In either case, it is essential that every needy victim
have the greatest possible opportunity to claim. It will not do to invoke laissez-faire
economism, arguing that victims may "choose" not to claim. For the laissez-faire
economist first must eliminate the market imperfections that lawyers have created-
the monopoly of representation, the rules against intraprofessional competition-
before insisting that such "choices" maximize individual utility. Lawyers continue
to debate whether the amount of compensation should be diminished by payments
from "collateral sources"-such as private and social insurance--or whether these
constitute repayments for value given. 73 But even were we to endorse deductions for
collateral sources (which I do not), this would not alter the importance of increasing
the frequency of claims.
The Oxford study found that the households of victims with injuries resulting in
two weeks of incapacity were significantly poorer than average-if, at the time of
the interview, the victim still was unemployed or seriously disabled as a result of the
accident, household income was only half of the national average. 74 Both the
personal tragedy and the social cost are compounded by the fact that victims are
disadvantaged in other ways as well. Because women suffered more of their injuries
in "other" environments, where claims and recoveries are rare, they obtained
damages only half as often as men. 75 The young (under age 25) and the elderly (over
69. Upham, Litigation and Moral Consciousness in Japan: An Interpretative Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution
Suits, 10 LAw & Soc'y REv. 579, 587 (1976); Wagatsuma & Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in
Japan and the United States, 20 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 461 (1986).
70. See, e.g., HONOUR AND SHAAsE (J. Peristiany ed. 1965); Girs AND PolsoN: THE PoLMcs OF REPUTATION (F. Bailey
ed. 1971); Abel, The Rise of Capitalism and the Transformation of Disputing: From Confrontations over Honor to
Competition for Property, 27 UCLA L. REv. 223, 244 (1979) (review of J. STARR, DisPurE AND SErn.BtNsr D Rmsj
TURKEY); Gr6nfers, Social Control and Law in the Finnish Gypsy Community: Blood Feuding as a System of Justice, 24
J. LEO. PURAuS.i 101 (1986).
71. For fictional accounts, see S. YURICK, FERTiG (1975) and M. BORGENIcHT, EX-TREm REsMEDIEs (1967).
72. COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT, supra note 3, at 3, 276, 313.
73. The amounts that English accident victims recovered from all sources did not cover their actual losses. See
COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT, supra note 3, at 312-13.
74. Abel, supra note 4, at 1021.
75. COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT, supra note 3 at 52.
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age 54) were similarly disadvantaged compared to those in the middle, and the
employed were much more likely to receive compensation than those outside
employment. 76 An American study found that the likelihood of retaining counsel and
the ratio of net reparations to economic loss in serious automobile accidents varied
directly with family income.77
The ABA-ABF study of the legal needs of the public, by contrast, found that
women with personal injury problems were more likely than men to consult lawyers
(forty-three percent versus twenty-six percent), blacks and Latinos more likely to do
so than whites (forty-four percent versus thirty-two percent), and those with incomes
in the lowest fifth more likely than those in the highest (forty-four percent versus
twenty-four percent); and the mean years of schooling of those suffering property
damage who consulted a lawyer were lower than that of those who did not (11.5
versus 12.5 years). 78 One reason for these counterintuitive findings may be the fact
that those in the lower income brackets were significantly less likely to carry loss
insurance than those in the upper, so that tort claims were their only alternative (a
remedy less likely than loss insurance to produce compensation). 79 Most of the
differences in the proportions of those perceiving a tort problem who consulted a
lawyer were reversed when the study looked at who reported experiencing a tort
problem: the proportion of male respondents was higher than that of women, that of
whites higher than that of blacks and Latinos, and that of the better educated and
wealthier higher than that of the less well educated and poorer.80 These differences
seem to reflect perceptions rather than objective experience: the United States Bureau
of the Census has found that twenty-five percent of blacks aged 16 or older are
disabled compared to twenty percent of whites and twenty-three percent of women
are disabled compared to eighteen percent of men.8t If those categories with fewer
injuries are more likely to perceive the extent of their injuries, one reason may be that
their general sense of social empowerment allows them to recognize their situation as
remediable. 82 When the two processes of naming an experience as a tort and deciding
76. Abel, supra note 4, at 1008-10.
77. U.S. DEPArPaExr OF TRANSPORTAnoN, 1 EcoNo.uC COINSEQUENCES OF AuromroiLE ACCIDENT INiuRIEs 54 (1970).
78. CuRRAN. supra note 21, at 148, 151 n.123, 156, 159.
79. Id. at 157. This also may explain the inverse correlation between income and tort claims in the Oxford survey.
See Abel, supra note 4, at 1009-10.
80. CutRsAN, supra note 21, at 122-28.
81. Census Study Reports I in 5 Suffering from a Disability, supra note 20, at 7. Racial minorities also are
disproportionately the victims of less visible forms of tortious activity.
Although 53 percent of white Americans live in areas with [hazardous] waste sites ... communities with the
greatest numbers of dumps had the highest concentration of non-white residents .... [M]ore than 15 million
of the nation's 26 million blacks lived in communities with one or more uncontrolled toxic dump;... more than
8 million of the nation's 15 million Hispanic residents lived in communities with one or more uncontrolled sites;
and . . . three of the five largest commercial hazardous waste landfills in the country were in predominantly
black and Hispanic communities.
The study also said that in communities with at least one waste dump, the proportion of the black and
Hispanic residents was 24 percent, twice the national average. Communities with two dumps had an average of
38 percent minority residents.
Williams, Racial Discrimination Charged in Location of Toxic Waste Dumps, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1987, at 12.
82. The likelihood that consumers would voice claims about nonprice problems varied directly with consumer
income. Best & Adreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing
Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, supra note 49, at 721 (1977). Since it is highly unlikely that wealthier consumers
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to consult a lawyer about it are combined, the proportion of male respondents who
consulted lawyers about automobile accident torts was higher than the proportion of
women, and the mean 1973 discretionary income and mean years of schooling
completed of those who did so was quite high ($10,000 and twelve years), although
a higher proportion of black and Latino respondents than white respondents consulted
lawyers about automobile accidents. 83 When we encounter similar differences across
class, race, gender, or age in the level of participation in political life (voting), the
economy (unemployment rates, incomes), culture (literacy), or social services (years
of schooling completed, health), we are deeply upset. One of the reasons why the
California legislature is seeking to increase registration and voting is that sixteen
percent of voters are racial minorities compared to forty-one percent of non-voters
and that twenty-eight percent of voters had incomes over $50,000 a year, whereas
only forty-one percent of non-voters earned more than $30,000. 84 Thus, compassion,
efficiency, and equity all argue for increasing tort claims rates in order to compensate
more victims.
Although tort lawyers and scholars differ about the relative virtues of negligence
and strict liabilty, they agree that tort law must play an important role in discouraging
dangerous behaviour. Indeed, even were we content to allow victims to decide
whether or not to seek apologies or compensation from tortfeasors, we could not
adopt an equally laissez-faire attitude towards the deterrent role of tort liability. When
our society views the danger of injury as particularly salient, it does not rely
exclusively on victims to mobilize the legal system. We subject driving behavior to
extensive regulation; and both the police and insurance companies help accident
victims record the evidence and initiate claims. We also regulate safety at work; and
both fellow workers and unions assist victims in correcting dangerous conditions and
obtaining redress for injury. In the other realms of behavior, which actually account
for the vast majority of accidents, tort law has become an even more crucial deterrent
as the Reagan Administration has dismantled the already inadequate regulatory
apparatus.
A single study will illustrate the failure of regulation and the magnitude of the
problem that the tort system confronts. The Food and Drug Administration is
responsible for inspecting imported fruits and vegetables for contamination with
pesticides and other toxic chemicals banned in the United States. Imports accounted
for a fourth of the total consumption of fruits in the United States in 1984, and the
proportion was rising rapidly. However, the FDA actually inspects less than one
percent of the one million annual shipments. Even this lamentable effort disclosed
that six percent of the sample contained illegal residues. Yet once violations were
identified, enforcement was unbelievably lax. A General Accounting Office study of
164 lots of adulterated food detected by the FDA found that ninety-one were stopped
and seventy-three were admitted to the country. Within the latter category, the FDA
bought goods of lower objective quality than those bought by poorer consumers, the more plausible explanation is that
wealthier consumers had higher standards of performance and felt more capable of securing redress.
83. CR , supra note 21, at 197-99.
84. Ingram, supra note 58, at 3.
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decided not to seek damages in fifty-two cases. Of the twenty-one prosecuted,
damages were imposed in only eight and paid within the following year in only two
cases. 85 Producers and importers acting rationally could only conclude that they
should ignore FDA regulations.
In the absence of effective regulation, what must the tort system do to discourage
dangerous behavior? Years of research on the deterrent effect of sanctions repeatedly
has confirmed that the likelihood of suffering punishment is at least as important as
the severity of that punishment and probably more influential. Indeed, we cannot
increase the efficacy of deterrence by raising penalties indefinitely because society
grows more reluctant to impose punishment as penalties become more severe. In any
case, punitive damage awards remain rare,86 and compensatory damages, by
definition, are limited to the victim's actual loss. Therefore, critics of the tort system
who would curtail punitive damages, eliminate or cap elements of compensatory
damages, such as pain and suffering, and deduct collateral sources should welcome
a proposal to make up for the loss of deterrent efficacy by increasing the frequency
of claims.
Tort liability presumably is most effective in influencing the behavior of
economically rational actors-medium or large profit-seeking enterprises in compet-
itive markets engaged in repetitive activities and thus capable of learning how to
modify their behavior as a result of tort damages imposed on themselves or others.
Therefore, we probably should discount the efficacy of tort liability as a deterrent in
precisely those situations where research shows that such liaibility is most likely,
namely road accidents. 87 And in the United States we cannot use tort liability to
reduce danger at work-the environment in which victims are next most likely to
claim-because workers' compensation generally is the exclusive remedy, and it
consciously is designed not to reflect the full costs of accidents. Consequently, tort
liability is most likely to be an effective deterrent of "other" accidents.
Tort damages not only instruct potential tortfeasors how to be safer, they also
inform consumers about dangerous goods and products. Lawsuits for toxic shock
syndrome, IUDs, or airplane crashes undoubtedly changed consumer choices. The
federal government has begun making data available about mortality rates at hospitals
so that consumers of medical services can make more informed choices. 88 When a
85. Molotsky, FDA Is Faulted on Imported Food, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1986, § I, at 23, col. 1. Nevertheless, the
U.S. Commissioner of Food and Drugs reassured a House subcommittee that "the U.S. food supply is safe." Shabecoff,
F.D.A. Chief Defends Safety of Imported Produce, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1987, at 11.
In the first six years of the Reagan Administration, only one criminal prosecution was brought for violation of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act-for an assault on an inspector by a company representative. Rosenblatt, Justice
Dept. Accused ofignoring Safety Cases, L.A. Times, Part I, at 2, col. 6. The Utah coal mine fire in which 27 workers
died led the Mine Safety and Health Administration to seek fines of only $I 11,000. $111,000 in Fines Assessed in Utah
Mine Fire That Killed 27, L.A. Times, May 12, 1987, Part I, at 20, col. 1.
86. Less than an average of 16 Cook County tort trials and 8 San Francisco tort trials a year awarded punitive
damages between 1980 and 1984. M. PEmEoN, PUnMvE DA. SIEs: PrE.suNAsy E.nlucA FINDINGS (1985) (N-2342-ICJ),
quoted in ISrnmr FOR CIvIL JusTcE, RaND CoRsosRroN, AN OVERvIEw OF THE FIrsr SLx PROGRAMi YEARS 69 (1986).
87. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
88. Brinkley, U.S. Distributing Lists of Hospitals with Unusual Death Rates, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1986, § I, at
10, col. 2; Brinkley, U.S. Releasing Lists of Hospitals With Abnormal Mortality Rates, N.Y. Times, March 12, 1987,
at 1. And the Aviation Safety Institute has sought to disseminate similar information about airplane crashes to travellers.
Aircraft Data for the Public Is Debated by Industry Aides, N.Y. Times, August 23, 1987, at 11.
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Los Angeles medical society established a "hot-line" to warn physicians about new
patients who had filed medical malpractice claims in the past, the Los Angeles
plaintiffs' personal injury bar threatened to respond with its own computer service
informing prospective patients of malpractice claims filed against doctors; both sides
eventually backed down. 89 And recent California legislation requires lawyers to
report to the State Bar the filing of three or more malpractice suits against them within
a twelve month period, a report that becomes a public record. 90 The free-market
advocates who decry the "litigation explosion" and the "liability insurance crisis"
must, if they are to be true to their ideology, applaud all these efforts to reduce market
imperfections by increasing consumer information.
Yet our limited data strongly suggest that tort liability for "other" accidents fails
to deter because too few victims claim. The Oxford study found that only three
percent of those incapacitated for at least two weeks by an "other" accident
(eighty-six percent of all those so incapacitated by injury) made a claim, and only two
percent recovered any damages. 91 A profit-seeking entrepreneur in a competitive
market would have to discount the threat of tort liability by ninety-eight percent in
deciding how much to spend on safety. This is not a matter of personal callousness
or indifference because it is not a matter of individual choice. An entrepreneur who
fails to cut safety costs whenever the tort system allows such savings will be put out
of business by a competitor who does. A 1976 survey of 210 members of the
Machinery and Allied Products Institute confirms the suspicion that liability is an
insubstantial threat-only eighteen percent said they had serious tort problems. 92
Thus, raising the frequency of claims is essential if tort is to play its central role in
discouraging dangerous behavior.
This concludes my argument for increasing the frequency of claims by tort
victims. I have shown that the level of claiming presently is extremely low. I have
argued that claiming should be encouraged just as we encourage participation in
political, economic, and cultural life and the consumption of social services. And I
have asserted that the generally accepted theories of tort law require the highest
possible level of claiming in order to strengthen norms against endangering others,
relieve victims' feelings of injury, compensate victims, and generally discourage
dangerous behavior. The failure to claim actually erodes norms and encourages risk.
And even if one accepted the dubious deterrent theory that increasing the magnitude
of the penalty could make up for its infrequency, it still is necessary to respond to the
victims' hurts and needs for compensation in every case. Before suggesting how the
claims rate might be raised, I want to insist on the importance of doing so. A higher
claims rate has the potential to change the functioning of the tort system more
substantially than any other politically feasible change. If we could persuade all tort
89. Doctors and Lawyers Square Off on Legal Records, L.A. Times, Dec. 26, 1985, at 11. U.D. Registry Inc.,
of Van Nuys, California, has information on more than one million Southern California tenants who have been the object
of eviction proceedings, which it sells to local landlords. Klein, Data Sod by Firm Unfair to Tenants, Court Suit Alleges,
L.A. Times, April 28, 1987, Part II, at 1.
90. CAL. BUs. & PRoF. CoDE § 6068(n)(1) (West 1987).
91. Abel, supra note 4, at 1012-13.
92. G. HA s & P. RurEr, supra note 16, at 74 n.2.
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victims to claim, we would more than double the efficacy of the tort system in road
and work accidents and increase it fiftyfold in the remaining situations, which
constitute eighty-six percent of all serious accidents according to the Oxford study.
No change in substantive or procedural rules could have an equivalent impact. This
demonstrates the contribution that a critical sociology of law can make to social
reform as well as to our theoretical understanding of the legal system.
IV. HELPING VICTIMS CLAIM
There are many ways to assist tort victims in making claims. We could seek to
increase the number of lawyers by reducing entry barriers, such as the length and cost
of formal education or the low pass rates on bar examinations (neither of which has
any proven connection with the quality of legal services). This should lower the cost
of those services. We could increase government subsidies for legal services by
extending legal aid eligibility to the middle class. 93 But given the prevalence of'
contingent fees, these reforms would have limited consequences, encouraging claims
only where damages were small or liability uncertain. We also could, and certainly
should, increase the speed with which courts decide tort claims, since delay may
discourage claimants from filing and lead them to abandon claims.
I believe, however, that the most effective means of increasing the level of
claiming would be for lawyers to take a more active role in encouraging victims to
claim. The Oxford study shows that the greatest attrition among accident victims
occurs at the earliest stages of the claims process-considering whether to claim and
deciding to consult a lawyer. 94 Less than half of all road and work accident victims
and less than a tenth of all other accident victims considered claiming; four-fifths of
road accident victims who thought a claim possible consulted a lawyer, less than
three-fifths of work accident victims, and slightly more than two-fifths of other
accident victims. Once the victim consulted a lawyer, some recovery was very likely:
nearly nine-tenths of road accident victims who saw a lawyer recovered damages,
three-fourths of work accident victims, and two-thirds of other accident victims.
Furthermore, it is during attrition at the early stages of the claims process that bias is
93. See Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REv. 474, 616 (1985).
Group prepaid legal service plans also can encourage claiming. The AFL-CIO recently announced that it would offer a
plan to its 12.8 million members, more than doubling national enrollment in such plans. Weinstein, AFL-CIO Starts Legal
Services Program, L.A. Times, Feb. 17, 1987, Part I, at 4, col. 4.
94. Abel, supra note 4, at 1013. See Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming .... 15 Lw & Soc'" REv. 631 (1981). Ve argued in the Article that "naming" an event
as a wrong was the most important step in the legal process and could be learned. The neurologist Oliver Sacks offers a
striking analogy to the process by which physicians recognize a disease.
The day after I saw Ray [his first patient with Tourette's syndrome], it seemed to me that I noticed three
Touretters in the street in downtown New York. I was confounded, for Tourette's syndrome was said to be
excessively rare. It had an incidence, I read, of one in a million.... The next day, without specially looking,
I saw another two in the street.... Suppose (I said to myself) that Tourette's is very common but fails to be
recognised but once recognised is easily and constantly seen....
Three years later, in 1974, I found that my fantasy had become a reality: that there had indeed come into
being a Tourette's Syndrome Association. It had fifty members then: now, seven years later, it has a few
thousand.
SAcKs, THE MAN WHo MLs'rooR His WIF FOR A HAT 94-95 (1987).
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introduced: more women drop out than men and more of the young and elderly than
those in between. 95 Finally, we know that lawyers themselves have constructed the
public's sense of legal entitlement by institutionalizing their services in some
situations and not others. 96 Thus, lawyers have the power, and the obligation, to alter
existing patterns of legal mobilization and can do so most efficiently by intervening
at the early stages of the claiming process.
Lawyers could do so in two ways. Since the Supreme Court decision in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona,97 lawyers have been allowed to advertise, and plaintiff's
personal injury lawyers regularly do so. However, the Supreme Court, in Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Association,98 sustained the power of states to limit solicitation where
the lawyer expects financial gain from representing the client, and all jurisdictions
continue to prohibit such solicitation. Although I agree that Ohralik's behavior in that
case was contemptible and deserved punishment, I regret that the Court used the
occasion to condemn all personal solicitation. 99 Existing limitations on fraud and
overreaching and the kind of cooling-off period often imposed on door-to-door selling
adequately could protect potential clients against lawyer abuses. Our concern for the
privacy of tort victims-sometimes invoked to justify the ban on solicitation-does
not extend to protecting victims against the importunities of insurance claims
adjusters. 10 Presently, only those lawyers willing to risk disciplinary sanctions
engage in ambulance chasing; 01 there is at least some truth in the conventional faith
of economists that freer competition among lawyers would eliminate the worst abuses
of solicitation. Furthermore, given the dominance of market incentives under
capitalism, it makes sense to harness the profit motive of individual lawyers to the
task of increasing the frequency of tort claims.
Nevertheless, I reluctantly have concluded that it is unrealistic to expect that
state bars or supreme courts voluntarily will allow lawyers to engage in individual
solicitation or that the U.S. Supreme Court will overrule Ohralik and extend first
amendment protection to such behavior. Lawyers continue to find it objectionable on
two grounds. Even more than advertising, solicitation intensifies intraprofessional
competition, potentially driving down prices (and thus profits for some), and
accelerating the concentration of business, to the detriment of solo and small firm
practitioners. Solicitation is also more threatening to the view that lawyers are
unconcerned with financial gain, an image the profession believes is essential to
maintain its social status. Therefore, I propose that the legal profession engage in
collective solicitation directed to accident victims. Because this would be done by
95. Abel, supra note 4, at 1008-09.
96. Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 401 (1975).
97. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
98. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
99. Id. at 472 (Marshall, J., concurring). In other decisions, the Supreme Court has indicated that the first
amendment protects at least some mailings by lawyers to those who are not already clients, In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191
(1982), and advertisements that target the victims of particular accidents, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105
S.Ct. 2265 (1985) (involving advertisements directed to victims of the Dalkon Shield).
100. Ross, Se-rruo Our OF COuRT (1970); Reichstein, Ambulance Chasing: A Case Study of Deviation and Control
Within the Legal Profession, 13 Soc. PloBs. 3 (1965).
101. J. CA uNa, LAwYERs oN THEm OwN 85-89 (1962); Reichstein, supra note 100, at 3.
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professional associations rather than individual lawyers seeking personal gain, it
should enjoy first amendment protection. 102 Because it would be collective, offering
no competitive advantage to any lawyer or category of lawyers, it should avoid
widening the numerous fissures within the profession. Moreover, I believe it can be
presented in such a way as to enhance rather than diminish the public image of
lawyers. Indeed, collective solicitation is simply an incremental extension of lawyer
referral services, which the profession has embraced enthusiastically. 0 3 Finally,
collective solicitation may pave the way for individual solicitation, just as collective
advertising preceded individual advertising; collective activity allays fears about loss
of professional status; and once it is attempted, individual promotional activity
quickly is seen to be far more effective.
My proposal is modeled on the experience of the Greater Manchester [England]
Legal Services Committee. 104 In March 1979, it began distributing leaflets explaining
the legal rights of accident victims (including their right to legal aid) and suggesting
how they could obtain advice; the leaflet included a coupon offering a free initial
interview with a solicitor.' 0 5 Victims were encouraged to send the coupon to the
Committee at the Manchester Law Society office, which referred each inquiry to a
local solicitor, who contacted the applicant to arrange an appointment. Within the
first twenty-one months, 20,000 leaflets were distributed to hospitals, public
libraries, Citizens' Advice Bureaux, and other agencies that advise the public
(another 10,000 subsequently were translated into Bengali, Gujarti, Hindi, Punjabi,
102. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); United Mine workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); United Transportation Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971). The New York Emergency Civil Liberties
Union offered to represent victims of police brutality in the course of studying those abuses. See P. CHEVIGNY, PoucE PoweR
(1969).
103. B. C"RmEsEN, LAw-Es FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANs, ch. 5 (1970); Berg, Lawyer Referral Services, in LEGAL
SERvicEs FOR THnE MIDDLE CLSS 1 (1979).
104. H. GENN, ME mG LEGAL NEErs? AN EVALuAnON OF A SCuwie FOR PERSONAL Iserv ViciSMAs (1982).
105. Id. at 68-69.
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and Urdu). The Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies surveyed a sample of those
who returned coupons between March 1979 and December 1980 (353 usable
responses, seventy-eight percent response rate).
This experiment (hereinafter called the Program) significantly altered the
composition of the claimant population and increased the rate of claiming. Whereas
the Centre's National Compensation Survey (hereinafter called the Survey) had found
that male victims of serious accidents were nearly twice as likely to recover damages
as women, fifty-five percent of those who responded to the Program were women. 106
Whereas the Survey had found that only three percent of victims under age 16 and six
percent of victims over age 65 consulted a lawyer, compared to twenty percent of
those between the ages of 31 and 51, the Program reached higher proportions of those
in the age categories of 10-19, 50-69, and especially over 70.107 The Survey had
found that those in full-time employment were only half of all victims but
three-fourths of successful claimants; by contrast, those employed full-time were only
forty percent of the respondents to the Program, with the rest distributed among
part-time employees, the retired, housewives, those in full-time education, and the
unemployed, the sick, and the disabled. 108 However, the Program did not alter the
class bias of tort remedies; indeed, professionals, employers and managers, and
skilled manual workers were even more overrepresented among its respondents than
among those accident victims who already obtain legal advice, according to the
Survey. 109
Just as the source of bias identified by the Survey was the unequal distribution
of victims by gender, age, and employment status among the three categories of
accidents-road, work, and other-in which legal responses were institutionalized to
different degrees, so the Program was able to reduce this bias by reaching victims of
"other" accidents. The Survey had found that among those serious accident victims
who sought legal advice, forty-three percent had suffered accidents on the road,
forty-six percent at work, but only eleven percent in other situations; among
respondents to the Program by contrast, road accident victims were twenty-seven
percent, work accident victims thirty-four percent, and other accident victims
thirty-eight percent-more than a threefold increase in the last category."10 The
Survey found that the likelihood of filing a claim varied directly with the severity of
the injury, but the likelihood of recovery varied inversely with severity; those who
responded to the Program, by contrast, tended to be the most seriously incapacitated,
including a significant number who had been "ill" for more than two months.",
Two-fifths of those who responded to the Program said, retrospectively, that
they had not considered claiming before seeing a leaflet, and nearly two-thirds never
previously had consulted a solicitor about any matter." 2 Qualitative evidence
106. Abel, supra note 4, at 1008; Gm, supra note 104, at 8-9.
107. Abel, supra note 4, at 1009; GENN, supra note 104, at 10-I1.
108. Abel, supra note 4, at 1010; GENN, supra note 104, at 11-12.
109. Abel, supra note 4, at 1009; GENN, supra note 104, at 11, 13-14.
110. comPEnSAI1ON AND SuppoRT, supra note 3, at 62; GENN, supra note 104, at 13-15.
111. Abel, supra note 4, at 1018; GENN, supra note 104, at 16-18.
112. GENN, supra note 104, at 21-22, 24.
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supports the conclusion that the Program reached victims who otherwise would not
have claimed:
Most working class people have an inbuilt fear of solicitors and legal matters .... I would
not have gone to see a solicitor as I was worried about any possible costs I may incur....
The scheme is really marvellous, especially for people who are nervous when it comes
to seeing a solicitor because it breaks the ice when a solicitor is picked for them." 3
It helped to make my mind up to see a solicitor. The posters and leaflets are displayed
so that many people who would not think about claiming are persuaded to try by the posters.
I was dithering about going to see a solicitor. The leaflet convinced me that at least I could
try for some compensation if a solicitor advised me that I had a claim.1 4
Those who deplore the "litigation explosion" suggest, if they do not always
assert outright, that many lawsuits are frivolous, unfounded, trivial, and unnecessary.
Proponents of collective solicitation of accident victims must anticipate and respond
to such criticisms by showing that the claims they encourage are legally valid and
socially valuable. The solicitors who interviewed the respondents to the Manchester
Program advised eighty percent of them to claim, and the proportions were as high
in "other" accidents as in work accidents (though lower in both categories than in
road accidents). 1 5 Men and women claimed in equal proportions, thereby helping to
reduce the gender bias built into the tort system. 116 The solicitors who advised the
Manchester Program respondents to claim reported that forty-two percent of those
claims had been settled by the time of the Centre's study, forty-one percent were the
subject of ongoing negotiations, and only sixteen percent had been abandoned." 7
Furthermore, the amounts paid to the claimants were substantial: an average of
£1,210, ranging from £647 for "other" accident victims (most of whom were
unemployed women) to £1,853 for road accident victims. "8 It seems clear that both
the victims and society benefitted as a result of these claims.
Fears that collective solicitation might damage the professional status of solicitors
seem wholly unfounded. On the contrary, it appears to enhance the legitimacy of both
the profession and the legal system. One user of the Program responded:
I must say not having been for an interview before I was struck by the helpfulness of the
solicitor. My workmates, family and friends are totally ignorant of aspects of the law. I now
know that legal aid or legality is open to all, not just the rich but the lowly as well.' '9
Solicitors agreed:
This is a particularly worthwhile scheme in that if the claim is successful then there will
invariably be a benefit-however great or small-for the client at the end of the day. It appears
113. Id. at4.
114. Id. at 22. Other first users also sought help in choosing a lawyer. See F. MAReS, R. HAUAUER & R. CLIFtrON,
THE SHREVEPORT PLAN: AN EXPERIEN" IN THE DEarvER OF LEGAL SsvicEs 67-71 (1974) [hereinafter THE SHREVEpORT PLAN).
115. GE, supra note 104, at 27.
116. Id. at 28.
117. Id. at 30.
118. Id. at 31. The mean damages recovered by victims in the Centre's Survey were: £1,135 all victims, £1,369 road
accidents, £850 work accidents, and £1,202 "other" accidents. The median damages were £500 in the Survey and £600
in the Program. Id. at 31-32; COPENSATION AND SUPPORT, supra note 3, at 87.
119. GRNN, supra note 104, at 24. Not all users were equally satisfied, however. Id. at 34-35.
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that many people simply do not know or even think of the possibility that there may be a right
of action, and a further number clearly don't think of seeing a solicitor about this.120
Since 1979, the scheme has spread to thirty of the 120 local law societies in
England and Wales. The National Law Society therefore decided to extend the
"Accident Free-Interview Scheme" throughout the country in May 1987.121 All
solicitors who include personal injury as a subject they practice in the legal aid lists
available to potential clients will be asked if they wish to offer a free initial interview
to accident victims. The Scheme will be publicized through Citizens Advice Bureaux,
libraries, local offices of the Department of Health and Social Services, community
health councils, and local health authorities. Leaflets will indicate a freepost address
and a London telephone number to call, which will refer the applicant to a local
participating solicitor. Physicians and hospitals have been hostile to the Program, and
the British Medical Authority has refused to endorse it; but there is reason to believe
that private medicine in the United States would be more receptive to a program that
could help to pay its bills.
Collective solicitation of accident victims could have benefits beyond increasing
claims in those cases. A number of empirical studies suggest that claiming is learned
behavior-those who claim successfully once are more likely to do so again. Victims
of automobile accidents in New York City in 1957 were more likely to claim if they
had done so successfully in the past. 122 Black unskilled workers in Shreveport,
Louisiana, who belonged to a group prepaid legal services plan in 1971, were more
likely to use the plan if they had consulted lawyers previously. 123 The mere existence
of the plan, furthermore, increased the likelihood that members would perceive
lawyers as a useful resource in a wide variety of situations. 124 The most comprehen-
sive American study of lawyer use confirmed these findings: although two-thirds of
the sample had used a lawyer at least once during their lifetimes, seventeen percent
had done so twice, ten percent three times, six percent four times, three percent five
times, one percent six times, and one percent more often. 125 The more frequently a
respondent had used a lawyer, the more likely the respondent was to believe that the
legal system could help claimants. 126 The most comprehensive English study, the
Users' Survey conducted for the Royal Commission on Legal Services in 1978, found
that, although only fifty-seven percent of the respondents had ever used a lawyer,
forty-six percent of those who had done so had used that lawyer more than once. 127
Furthermore, seventy percent of those who had used a solicitor in 1977 said they
would return to that solicitor if they encountered a similar problem in the future. 28
A similar study in Scotland found that, although only thirty-nine percent of
120. Id. at 50.
121. 83 THE LAW Soclary's GAzETTE 3648-49 (Dec. 3, 1986).
122. R. HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTm, supra note 36, at 11.
123. THE SHRVr oRoT PLAN, supra note 114, at 63.
124. Id. at 79.
125. Comm, supra note 21, at 190.
126. Id. at 235.
!27. ROYAL CoMis SIoN oi LEGAL Savicas, 2 Final Report 185, 210 (1979) (Cmnd 7648-1).
128. Id. at 232.
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respondents had ever consulted a solicitor, among those who had done so within the
previous five years, fifty-eight percent had done so more than once, and twelve
percent had done so more than five times. 129 Thus, persuading injury victims to claim
compensation may have the beneficial effect of increasing their willingness to use the
legal system again in the future.
CONCLUSION
For too long the media have disseminated and the public uncritically has
believed the pronouncements of self-styled Jeremiahs decrying the alleged litigious-
ness of Americans. Their claims are unsubstantiated and false. Litigation rates are
low and rising too slowly. 130 Vast numbers of accident victims fail to seek and thus
to recover any compensation whatever. The most significant reform of the tort
system-far more consequential than any incremental change in substantive or
procedural law-would be to make it begin to fulfill its promises by responding to a
higher proportion of victims.' 3' This would strengthen the norm against dangerous
behavior, relieve the anger of victims, ameliorate the financial plight of victims, and
encourage safety. Collective solicitation of the injured would be an important step in
this direction. The organized legal profession, and the plaintiffs' personal injury bar
in particular, have a strong interest in supporting collective solicitation. They can
initiate such a scheme by themselves, without the need to wait for state action. ' 32 Of
course, the reform will be opposed by many: the insurance industry; manufacturers,
retailers, and other potential defendants; the medical profession; and the personal
injury defense bar. 133 But these opponents will have great difficulty justifying their
hostility to the public. Proponents of the reform, by contrast, can invoke many
powerful political symbols. They will be seeking to help victims and to reduce the
dangers to all. They will be increasing access to the legal system and reducing bias
against those disadvantaged by race, sex, and class. Most importantly, they will be
assisting tort victims to serve society while seeking to help themselves. To assert a
legal claim is to perform a vital civic obligation.
129. RoYSA. Co missioN oN LEcsA. SEsvicEs IN ScotLAtN, 2 Report 55, 58 (1980) (Cmnd 7846-1).
130. I found that the rate of tort litigation per unit population, which was higher in Africa than in the United States,
tended to decline in Africa during the process of "modernization." Abel, Customary Laws of Wrongs in Kenya: An Essay
in Research Method, 17 A-m. J. Cosw. L. 573 (1969); Abel, Western Courts in Non-Western Settings: Patterns of Court
Use in ColonialandNeo-ColonialAfrica, in THEI rosmo or LAw 167 (S. Burman & B. Harrell-Bond eds. 1979). Lawrence
Friedman and Robert Percival found a similar decline in the United States. See Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts:
Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAw & Soc'y REv. 267 (1976). But see Lempert, More Tales of Two
Courts: Exploring Changes in the "Dispute Settlement Function" of Trial Courts, 13 LAw & Soc'y REv. 91 (1978).
131. For an argument that a critical social theory of law must hold law to its promises while critically examining
those promises, see Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical
Social Thought About Law, 11 LAw & Soc'y REv. 529 (1977).
132. Indeed, they already have done so. Personal injury lawyers cooperating with labor unions have begun contacting
workers who have been exposed to asbestos, offering free medical evaluations to all and, of course, legal representation
to those found to be suffering from asbestosis. These screenings have resulted in thousands of lawsuits. Richards & Meier,
Lattyers Lead Hunt For New Groups Of Asbestos Victims, wall St. J., February 18, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
133. "Bouyed by last year's voter approval of the 'deep-pockets' insurance initiative, a coalition of business groups,
manufactures and physicians unveiled an ambitious agenda of more radical proposals Thursday that would limit awards
in personal injury and product liability cases across the board." Wolinsky, 'Gouging Law ers' Hit by 'Deep-Pockets'
Group, L.A. Times, March 27, 1987, Part I, at 3, col. 4.
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